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I. INTRODUCTION
Between 2002 and 2003, the Honourable Peter deCarteret
Cory led an inquiry in the United Kingdom that examined
allegations of state collusion in paramilitary murder. The Cory
Collusion Inquiry arose out of the Weston Park Peace Negotiations.
For years, allegations of state collusion in murder cases had
obstructed the pursuit of a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The
Good Friday Accord of 1998 was not working, and the political
parties regrouped at Weston Park in 2001. It was at that time that
Prime Minister Tony Blair and Taoiseach Bertie Ahern jointly
proposed the appointment of a judge from outside the UK to review
the controversial cases and determine whether public inquiries
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were warranted. The judge selected was Peter Cory, then retired
from the Supreme Court of Canada.
I had the great privilege of serving as counsel to Peter Cory on
that inquiry. I witnessed, firsthand, his moral courage, his
determination to expose the truth, and his compassion for those
who had suffered personal loss. I would like, in the pages that
follow, to share some of those observations with you.
The announcement of the Cory Collusion Inquiry in the United
Kingdom was initially met with some skepticism. The level of
distrust outweighed any sense of optimism. However, all of that
changed when Peter Cory met with the families of the deceased,
and other interested parties. He put people at ease, and he very
quickly earned the respect and confidence of the public.
The cases to be reviewed spanned from 1987 to 1999 and
involved a broad range of circumstances. Four cases were chosen
by the British Government and two by the Irish. In each case, it was
alleged that state actors facilitated the killings either through
direct action, or by turning a blind eye to credible and serious
threats. Various state agencies were implicated, including the
Security Service (“MI5”), army intelligence, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (“RUC”), the prison service of Northern Ireland, the
Northern Ireland Office, and An Garda Siochana (“the Garda”), the
Irish police service.
To set the context, I will offer a brief description of the
murders under review. The following refers to evidence before the
Collusion Inquiry, and the findings made by Peter Cory. The
descriptions are based on the contents of the Cory Collusion
Inquiry Reports. They do not seek to incorporate disclosures or
findings made by subsequent tribunals.
II. SIX CASES; EIGHT MURDERS
A. Breen and Buchanan
The year 1987 saw the murder of two police officers, Chief
Superintendent Breen and Superintendent Buchanan. These
officers worked in the north. They were instructed to travel to the
south to meet with the Irish police force, An Garda Siochana, about
smuggling activities taking place in South Armagh. This area was
generally known as bandit country due to its lawless character. CS
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Breen spoke to his second-in-command the day before the
meeting. He told him that he felt uneasy about making the trip
because he believed that there was a mole, or a spy, in the Garda
supplying information to the IRA.
While he had these misgivings, CS Breen set them aside,
determined to do his duty. He and Buchanan drove to the south and
had their meeting. When it was done, they began their trip back to
the north. The officers had a choice of four roads to take back to
their detachment. They usually varied the route they took for
security reasons. That day, they chose a route along back roads. As
it turned out, this was a perfect location for an ambush.
The choice didn’t much matter. The IRA had manned all four
roads and were ready to attack whichever route was taken.
Dressed in military garb and posing as a military checkpoint, the
IRA members stopped civilian vehicles and had the drivers lay on
the road with their heads down. The effect of the stopped vehicles
and the civilians was to block the roadway so that the officers’
vehicle could not pass through quickly when it arrived.
According to the civilian eyewitnesses, Officer Buchanan
initially stopped the vehicle but seemed to realize that something
was amiss. He tried to back up the vehicle. As he did so, a white van
pulled up. Several masked gunmen jumped out and opened fire.
Buchanan was killed in short order, shot in the head at close
range. Breen, in the front passenger seat, was shot six times, but
was not mortally wounded. Notwithstanding his condition, he
managed to open the car door and step out of the vehicle. He
reached into his pocket and pulled out a white handkerchief. He
held it aloft in an apparent symbol of surrender. In response, one
of the masked men placed the muzzle of a gun to the back of his
head and pulled the trigger.
Breen and Buchanan were but two of many police officers
who lost their lives to sectarian violence. Peter Cory found there to
be state collusion based on evidence that an officer in the Garda
had facilitated the ambush by telling the paramilitaries when the
officers were on their way.
B. Finucane
Patrick Finucane was a respected solicitor. He was known to
represent republican clients, among others, charged with
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paramilitary violence. Patrick Finucane was a law-abiding citizen
who took his role as a solicitor very seriously. He believed that
everyone was entitled to representation. There was no evidence
linking Patrick Finucane to any paramilitary or other criminal
organization.
Nonetheless, as a result of his courageous defence of accused
persons, Patrick Finucane was erroneously seen to be personally
affiliated with the causes of his clients. This was the perception of
the RUC, it was the perception of the army and police and the
Security Service, and of some politicians. Regrettably, it was also
the perception of the UDA—the loyalist paramilitary group
responsible for Patrick Finucane’s murder.
On February 12, 1989, a Sunday evening, as Patrick Finucane
was sitting down to have dinner with his wife and young children,
masked gunmen broke into his home and shot him several times,
killing him. There was evidence to indicate that state intelligence
agencies knew that Patrick Finucane was going to be murdered
and that they did nothing to stop it.
In 1981, senior officials from army intelligence, the police, and
the Security Service met to discuss a threat to Patrick Finucane. It
had come to the attention of the Security Service that a known
loyalist assassin was intending to kill Patrick Finucane and that he
would carry out the threat once he obtained certain information.
According to the recorded minutes of the meeting, those present
saw this as a very real and imminent threat. The assassin had killed
others. There was debate about what should be done. A variety of
options were discussed, including issuing a warning to Patrick
Finucane. Those present rejected this option because as they put it,
Patrick Finucane might not keep his counsel. He might say
something to others. This would compromise the security of
ongoing intelligence operations. All of the options were rejected on
this basis. In the face of a very real and imminent threat of murder,
senior security officials agreed that they would do nothing at all.
Patrick Finucane was not murdered until some years later.
There was evidence that the government knew about that threat
as well.
Documents reviewed in connection with the Finucane murder
suggested that intelligence gathering had become an end in itself.
In one instance, Brian Nelson, an agent run by the Army
Intelligence Unit, reported that he was going to offer targeting
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information to another loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster
Volunteer Force (“UVF”), to help them carry out an assassination.
The handlers saw this as a positive development, commenting in
their report that, if the UVF carried out the attack, it would elevate
Nelson’s standing in the UDA. In other instances, handlers
provided information to Nelson that would facilitate UDA targeting
of individuals. Nelson was ultimately convicted of twenty terroristrelated offences, including five counts of conspiracy to commit
murder. It was the view of the army, as expressed by the
commanding officer of intelligence—that the government had to
commit crimes in order to infiltrate paramilitary groups.
The Finucane case illustrates what can happen when any
group in society, including the state, considers itself to be above
the law.
C. Nelson
At the time of her murder, Rosemary Nelson was forty years
old, a hard-working solicitor, a wife, and a mother to three young
children. As she was driving to work Monday morning, March 15,
1999, a car bomb exploded as she put her foot on the brake to slow
while rounding a curve in the road.
Like Patrick Finucane, Rosemary Nelson fearlessly undertook
her duties as a solicitor. Like Patrick Finucane, she often
represented republican and other clients charged with
paramilitary violence. Like Patrick Finucane, her representation of
these clients caused others, including the police and loyalist
paramilitaries, to view her as a paramilitary herself.
The years after Patrick Finucane’s murder were difficult.
Many lawyers were afraid to take on the defence of controversial
clients. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers, Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy, reported on the legal
system in Northern Ireland. He discovered that, after the Finucane
murder, many lawyers had either shut down their criminal
practices entirely, or had begun to turn away potentially
controversial clients.
Rosemary Nelson refused to succumb to intimidation. During
a media interview, she told a reporter that, while the murder of
Patrick Finucane had given her pause—after all, she had a husband
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and young children—she would not shirk her responsibilities as a
lawyer. In the end, she was murdered too.
Rosemary Nelson asked for protection from state agencies,
and others pleaded for protection on her behalf. Those requests
were denied. Peter Cory found collusion on the basis that the
government turned a blind eye to clear and credible threats against
Rosemary Nelson’s life. The Nelson case, along with the Finucane
murder, illustrate what can happen when the role of a lawyer in a
democratic society is misunderstood or, worse yet, deliberately
ignored.
D. Gibson
Lord Justice Gibson was murdered because of a statement he
made in court. He presided over a controversial trial in which RUC
officers were charged with killing three young men. It was alleged
that the officers had implemented the notorious shoot to kill
policy—said to authorize the shooting of suspected IRA members
on sight. Justice Gibson not only acquitted the officers, but
commended them for bringing the men to the final court of justice.
In the view of the IRA, these words sealed Justice Gibson’s fate.
The murder took place while the judge and his wife were
returning to Northern Ireland after a holiday in the Republic of
Ireland. They drove their car off the ferry in Dublin with a Garda
escort and proceeded to the border between the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland. When they got to the customs post,
Justice Gibson got out of his car, walked back to the car of the Garda
escorts, and thanked them for their assistance. The Gibsons then
drove the short distance across the border to meet the RUC escort
which was to take them to Belfast.
In that short distance, a bomb consisting of 500 pounds of
homemade explosives was detonated. The explosives were hidden
in a stolen car parked in the vicinity just fifteen or twenty minutes
before the explosion. The South Armagh Brigade of the IRA claimed
responsibility for the attack. The IRA also issued other public
statements indicating that the murders had been planned in
advance.
The very method by which the Gibsons were murdered raised
suspicion about collusion. Some suggested that someone in the
Garda must have provided the IRA with information about the
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judge’s itinerary. However, there was no evidence to support that
allegation. There was very little intelligence material that
discussed this murder. That which did exist was out of date and of
uncertain reliability.1
Justice Gibson was very open in discussing his travel plans
with others—it would not have been difficult for the IRA to learn
of those plans without intelligence being passed along. On that
basis, Peter Cory found no evidence of collusion in that case.
Nonetheless he offered the following observations about the
impact of the murder:
The killing of Lord Justice Gibson was not simply the murder
of an individual; it was a blow against the preservation of
justice in the community. It was a blow against much that
decent people cherish: the rule of law, and a forum for the
resolution of disputes which operates on the basis of law,
fairness and impartiality.

E. Hamill
The murder of Robert Hamill, a young member of the Catholic
community in Portadown, occurred one Saturday night as he
walked home from a local dance hall. The killing took place at an
intersection where Catholic and Protestant youths would
invariably cross paths after a night of drinking. This location was
known to be a flashpoint for sectarian violence. As he was walking
home with his friends, Robert Hamill was set upon by a group of
protestant men who beat him to death.
At the time of the attack four officers were sitting in a RUC
Land Rover—a vehicle much like a tank—parked at the
intersection. None of the officers rendered any assistance to Mr.
Hamill. One of the officers later instructed one of the attackers to
destroy the clothing that he wore the night he committed the
crime. Other actions by the officers in the vehicle could also be seen
as acts or omissions designed to assist the Protestant rioters who
killed Robert Hamill. On this basis, Peter Cory found that there was
evidence of state collusion.

1. Despite the findings of a subsequent inquiry, the document that we reviewed was
dated 10 years after the murders had occurred.
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F. Wright
Finally, the inquiry looked into the murder of Billy Wright.
Billy Wright was a dangerous man in his own right. He founded the
Loyalist Volunteer Force (“LVF”), a splinter group of the Ulster
Volunteer Force (“UVF”) that carried out violent acts even while
other Loyalist groups were obeying a ceasefire.
In 1997, a number of Republican and Loyalist groups had
agreed to a ceasefire; however two groups remained adamantly
opposed to it: on the republican side the Irish National Liberation
Army (“INLA”); and, on the loyalist side, the LVF. The organizations
were seen as bitter enemies of one another.
Billy Wright was serving an eight-year prison term. While
initially housed at Maghaberry Prison, Billy Wright was
transferred to HMP Maze in April 1997. Two INLA members,
Christopher McWilliams and John Kennaway were also transferred
to the Maze a few days later. Just prior to their transfer, McWilliams
and Kennaway had orchestrated a hostage-taking incident at
Maghaberry which was aimed at murdering Billy Wright. Their
plan was frustrated by Wright’s transfer to HMP Maze.
Remarkably, despite the incident at Maghaberry, LVF and
INLA prisoners were housed in the same H Block at the Maze.
Warring factions were but a stone’s throw apart in a prison where
the prisoners exercised a great deal of control, security was
unsatisfactory, and where there was no meaningful searches of
cells or other areas in the prison. This set the scene for Billy
Wright’s murder
Billy Wright was murdered on Boxing Day 1997 while he was
in a van waiting to be transported to a visitor’s area. INLA members
climbed up onto the roof of the H Block, apprehended the van, and
shot Billy Wright. Once they were detected on the roof, the gates to
the prison automatically locked, trapping the van and Billy Wright
in the path of his attackers.
Many irregularities took place at the time of the murder and
just before. There was evidence that prison officials had been
warned that Billy Wright would be murdered by INLA. Nothing was
done to prevent the killing. On this basis, Peter Cory found
evidence of collusion on the part of the Prison Service of Northern
Ireland. The murder of Billy Wright illustrates what can happen
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when the state abdicates its responsibility to protect all citizens
from harm, including those who stand convicted of crime.
III. INTERCONNECTIONS
While independently selected, there was a web of
interconnections linking the victims in these cases. Patrick
Finucane acted as counsel for one of the families at the shoot to kill
trial before Lord Justice Gibson. As border Superintendent, Bob
Buchanan was one of the first officers to attend at the scene to
investigate the murder of Lord Justice Gibson and his wife.
Rosemary Nelson was counsel for the family of Robert Hamill after
his murder and prior to her own. When Billy Wright’s diary was
recovered and was made public some years after his murder, it
contained a very clear and direct threat to kill Rosemary Nelson
and one of her clients.
IV. THE WORK OF THE INQUIRY
When Peter Cory met with senior representatives of both
governments, he was warned about the atmosphere of suspicion
and distrust that pervaded all things relating to his inquiry. It was
suggested that he ought to bring his own counsel from Canada. We
began as a team of three—Peter Cory, James O’Reilly (now Justice
O’Reilly) and me. A few months into the process, James O’Reilly
was appointed a judge of the Federal Court, and we forged ahead
as a team of two.
Peter Cory completed comprehensive inquiries into each of
these cases and filed six reports, each averaging 100 pages or more,
within a period of fifteen months. No one knew how long this
process would take. The Bloody Sunday inquiry had been
underway for approximately six years. Some estimated that we
would require around two to three years to complete our task. One
official, using a complicated mathematical formula, estimated that
our review would take close to thirty years. We liked that estimate
best, because we could brag that we came in twenty-eight and a
half years ahead of schedule.
The inquiry did not have powers of compulsion. It consisted
of a paper review, and interviews of witnesses who were willing to
speak voluntarily. We read many thousands of documents. Given
security classifications, we often had to review material on site.
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Many days were spent in small rooms filled with large stacks of
paper. The task was at times tedious, but it was never beneath
Peter Cory to roll up his sleeves and share the load. If I suggested
doing a review myself, he would respond: “If there are two of us, it
will be done in half the time.” And so it was that we logged
countless hours in a variety of different locations.
We were not always welcomed. One agency extended a chilly
reception, quite literally, when it sat us in a room so cold I had to
wear gloves to type. Another agency sat us with “watchers,” who
stared intently as we read through documents or walked to the
restroom. We responded to all of this with equanimity and, on
occasion, warmer clothing.
We came to learn that, as many documents as we saw, other
documents were not disclosed in a timely fashion. For example, an
addendum had to be written to the Finucane Report, because of
late receipt of documents proving that a commanding officer of the
British Army had perjured himself at Brian Nelson’s sentencing
hearing. Peter Cory made his displeasure known when cooperation
was withheld. He was determined that nothing stand in the way of
the inquiry. Always a gentleman—even when others were not—he
would not abide obstructions. If someone mistook his genteel
manner for a lack of determination, they were soon set straight.
Peter Cory wore a velvet glove but was not afraid to wield an iron
fist.
On one occasion—the first time that we were both absent
from the London office—representatives from the Security Service
attended at the office and demanded that staff turn over our
computer hard drives. Staff was told that it was essential in the
interests of national security. At the time, the Finucane Report was
in draft form, and asserted findings about various state agencies.
The Security Service wiped the hard drives clean and then
returned them to us. Fortunately, Peter Cory had the foresight to
store copies of our work product off-site, and the inquiry was able
to continue on course. After consulting with a trusted official in the
Metropolitan London Police, Peter Cory decided that he would
refrain from requesting an investigation into the incident. There
was a risk that it might set off collateral events and derail the
inquiry. This incident was recently the subject of a BBC series
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reporting on “untold stories of the troubles.”2 This story was
untold, but only so that the work of the inquiry could continue.
There were also personal challenges. Strange and sometimes
disturbing events occurred. Those in a position to know had
warned us that we would be followed, listened to, and subject to
harassment. We were cautioned that people would try to befriend
us to infiltrate the inquiry. While this might seem the stuff of cold
war fiction, I believe that those things did occur. Within that
atmosphere, reasonable paranoia was not an oxymoron.
Peter Cory was determined, from the outset, that there be no
appearance of bias or partiality attaching to the inquiry. When we
first arrived, a staff of young men was poised to start working on
the inquiry, assigned by the Northern Ireland Office of the British
Government. They were quietly sent back to their home offices.
Peter Cory explained that he could not work with staff from an
agency that was itself under investigation. We took to curating our
dining options. In Belfast on St. Patrick’s Day, it seemed a good
night to sample the local Chinese food restaurant. Invitations and
offers of friendship were also declined on this basis. Early on, a
newspaper article falsely reported that Peter Cory had told three
friends in a pub about the work of the inquiry. I remember thinking
that this was preposterous on many levels, among them the notion
that we had three friends.
On a personal level, it was an enormous privilege to work with
and learn from Peter Cory. He was an extremely generous teacher
and mentor, always quick to offer guidance and inspiration. He also
became a cherished friend. We often grabbed dinner at the end of
the working day, as neither of us were competent to prepare our
own food. We spoke of many things over dinner. Peter Cory spoke
of his family, his beloved wife Edith, his children and
grandchildren. He spoke about the Thomas Sophonow inquiry and
the tragedy of wrongful convictions. He told wonderful stories
about his days as a trial judge on circuit in Ontario. He reminisced
about flying a Lancaster bomber in the Second World War as a
young man, and the grief he still felt over the death of his gunner.
He spoke of his love for crème brûlée. He spoke with great humour
2. The Troubles: A Secret History - Episode 5 (BBC Spotlight), YOUTUBE.COM (Oct. 18,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCMrZHHGFXc&list=PLvh43USPWK1nUa72P3Jj6Vi9l5svdoWg&index=41 [https://perma.cc/C4R2-G4AQ].

256

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1

and indefatigable optimism. He understood the human condition
better than most and felt a deep empathy for the suffering of
others.
V. THE WORK AFTER THE INQUIRY
After all six reports were completed and submitted to the
respective governments, we began waiting for galley proofs. The
governments had the final say on whether content would be
redacted in the interests of national security. There was much
negotiation over what that phrase encompassed. Just as we were
trying to respond to letters from the Government, other
government officials were dismantling our offices. I recall someone
whisking away my keyboard almost as I was typing. The
correspondence continued after we returned to Canada. In one
letter, Peter Cory challenged a redaction by observing that “not
since Moses came down from the mount was something so much
in the public domain.” The redactions were not lifted, but Peter
Cory did persuade the government to include the edited pages in
the published report, with content blacked out, so that the public
would know just how much had been removed.
As negotiations continued, the families of victims were
suffering. They did not know the result of the inquiry, and their
anguish was compounded by false media reports claiming to have
the inside track. Peter Cory contacted the British Government and
implored them to end the suffering by telling the victims’ families
the reports’ conclusions. He reasoned that, while the contents
could not be disclosed, it would be an immense relief for the
families to know whether or not he had recommended an inquiry.
The Government did not respond to this request. Peter Cory raised
the issue again, this time adding that he would speak to the families
if the Government did not. Again, there was no response. On the
third occasion, receiving no response, Peter Cory took matters into
his own hands and contacted each of the families. He told them that
he could not discuss the content of the reports but shared with
them his ultimate finding.
This step greatly relieved the agony of uncertainty. It was
hailed by many in the UK as a courageous and heroic gesture. Some
media reports suggested that Peter Cory had embarrassed the
government of the day. Peter Cory was troubled by that
characterization, saying that it was never his intention to
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embarrass. He acted in the interests of humanity, moved by
compassion for the families and a desire to ease their suffering. As
it turned out, the disclosures shook loose the inertia surrounding
publication of the reports. Armed with the knowledge that an
inquiry had been ordered, the family of Patrick Finucane obtained
a ruling from a Belfast court that effectively compelled the
government to make the reports public. They remain available on
the internet today.3
Another conflict arose over the form that the inquiries would
take. Peter Cory felt very strongly that only public inquiries would
suffice to restore confidence in the police, the army, and other
government institutions. He made this point in his reports,
stressing that “without public scrutiny, doubts based solely on
myth and suspicion will linger long, fester and spread their
malignant infection throughout Northern Ireland.” These words
were intended as a pre-emptive strike. There were increasing signs
that the Government might be reluctant to hold a public inquiry
into the murder of Patrick Finucane. The Finucane Report was
highly critical of state intelligence gathering methods. Among
other things, it documented army handling of an agent, Brian
Nelson, who was later found to have committed twenty terroristrelated offences, five of which were conspiracies to commit
murders.
The concern about the Finucane inquiry was prophetic. In
2005, just one year after the Reports were submitted, the British
government passed new legislation that changed the inquiry
process. Under the Inquiries Act 2005, the government could
exercise control over the conduct of an inquiry. It could limit public
access, withhold material, and even step in to bring an inquiry to
an end. When he learned of the proposed legislation, Peter Cory
wrote a letter expressing disappointment in blunt terms:
It seems to me that the proposed new Act would make a
meaningful inquiry impossible. The Commissions would be
working in an impossible situation. For example, the Minister,
3. CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT, PATRICK FINUCANE, 2004, HC 470, (UK); CORY
COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT, ROSEMARY NELSON, 2004, HC 473, (UK); CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY
REPORT, CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT BREEN AND SUPERINTENDENT BUCHANAN, 2003, HC, (UK); CORY
COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT, LORD JUSTICE GIBSON AND LADY GIBSON, 2003, HC, (UK); CORY
COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT, ROBERT HAMILL, 2004, HC 471, (UK); CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY
REPORT, BILLY WRIGHT, 2004, HC 472, (UK).

258

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1

the actions of whose ministry was to be reviewed by the public
inquiry would have the authority to thwart the efforts of the
inquiry at every step. It really creates an intolerable Alice in
Wonderland situation. There have been references in the
press to an international judicial membership in the inquiry. If
the new Act were to become law, I would advise all Canadian
Judges to decline an appointment in light of the impossible
situation they would be facing. In fact, I cannot contemplate
any self-respecting Canadian Judge accepting an appointment
to an inquiry constituted under the new proposed Act.4

Despite the powerful objections raised by Peter Cory and
others, the Act passed. The review of the Finucane murder that
ultimately took place was not a public proceeding. It was a nonstatutory, document-based review with no oral hearings. Peter
Cory’s objections, raised in 2005, resonated many years later when
the matter came before the United Kingdom Supreme Court. In
February 2019, the Supreme Court declared that the Finucane
review had failed to comply with Article 2 of the European
Convention of Human Rights.5 There had not been a full and proper
investigation into a death in which the state was implicated. The

4. Letter from the Honourable Peter Cory to Chairman Chris Smith, Washington Cong.
Comm. (Mar. 15, 2005).
5. See In the matter of an application by Geraldine Finucane for Judicial Review
(Northern Ireland) [2019] UKSC 7. The court stated in para. 83:
83. It is well settled that article 2 gives rise to two species of obligation on
the part of the state, one substantive, the other procedural. Lord Phillips of
Worth Matravers PSC in In re McCaughey’s application for judicial review
[2012] 1 AC 725, in a pithy description of the nature of the obligations,
referred, at para. 2, to ECtHR’s decision in McCann v United Kingdom (1995)
21 EHRR 97 and said, “article 2 by implication [gives] rise not merely to a
substantive obligation on the state not to kill people but, where there was
an issue as to whether the state had broken this obligation, a procedural
obligation on the state to carry out an effective official investigation into the
circumstances of the deaths (‘the procedural obligation’).” (Evolving
human rights jurisprudence, both from Strasbourg and domestically, has,
of course, established that the procedural obligation to investigate deaths
can extend beyond those deaths in which state authorities are alleged to be
implicated - see, for instance (Application No 32967/96) Calvelii and Ciglio
v Italy, January 17, [2002] ECHR 3, 2001 at para. 53; (Application No
53749/00), Lazzarini and Ghiacci v Italy, November 7, 2002; Angelova and
Iliev v Bulgaria 47 EHRR 7; and Byrzykowski v Poland (2008) 46 EHRR 32,
para. 117.)
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“shortcomings of the procedures” had “hampered, if not indeed
prevented, the uncovering of the truth about this murder.”6
It has been eighteen years since the Collusion Inquiry
commenced. It is for others to evaluate the impact of the Cory
reports on the peace process. What I can say is that the man who
wrote the reports earned a place, not only in history, but in the
hearts and minds of many in Northern Ireland. People still speak of
him with reverence. His work is still cited by those seeking public
accountability. It is hence no surprise that, when Peter Cory died
on April 7, 2020, his passing was mourned in Ireland just as it was
in Canada, with moving public tributes offered in both countries.
He will not soon be forgotten in either place. Peter Cory was very
proud to be a Canadian. We in Canada should take pride in knowing
that such a great man walked among us.

6. Id. at para. 119. Note that the Court did not go so far as to order a public inquiry.
As it said in para. 153:
153. I would therefore make a declaration that there has not been an article
2 compliant inquiry into the death of Patrick Finucane. It does not follow
that a public inquiry of the type which the appellant seeks must be ordered.
It is for the state to decide, in light of the incapacity of Sir Desmond de Silva’s
review and the inquiries which preceded it to meet the procedural
requirement of article 2, what form of investigation, if indeed any is now
feasible, is required in order to meet that requirement.
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